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consistent proxies of the reputation endowment effect and bureaucracy effect respectively. In 
section six, an econometric analysis is performed. Section seven puts forward some 
conclusions as well as perspectives for further research. 
 
2. Explaining the Financial Supervision Regime: A Path Dependence Approach 
Goodhart (2004) wondered if the development of financial supervision architecture is 
designed or accidental. It has been argued regularly and frequently that the design of 
supervision is essentially reactive, lagging behind innovation and evolving risks, and that the 
reasons for supervisory reforms are largely political. We claim that the evolution of financial 
supervision is not accidental. To justify this, we investigate the determinants that should lead 
a country to reform or to maintain the supervisory regime, with particular attention to the role 
of the central bank. 
Our basis is that in each point of time, gains and losses of a supervisory model are 
expected variables, calculated by the policymakers that maintain or reform the supervisory 
regime. But the expectations of policymakers are likely to be influenced by structural 
economic and institutional variables, which may vary from country to country. Therefore, 
given the national economic and institutional endowment, these variables can determine, 
ceteris paribus, the policymaker’s expected gains or losses of a specific supervisory regime. 
The supervisory regime can become the dependent variable in a path dependence framework. 
Furthermore, economic agents do not have perfect information on the true preferences of the 
policymaker: his/her optimal degree of  supervision unification is a hidden variable. 
The crucial issue is the identification of the policymaker’s preferences. In the economic 
literature, there is lack of theoretical studies that consider the policymaker’s objective 
function for the financial supervisory design. The first approach to identify the policymaker’s 
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utility function could be the so-called narrative approach, in which official documents are 
interpreted to gauge the policymaker’s choices. The narrative approach has been extensively 
used in the monetary policy literature: see Potts and Luckett (1978), Wallace and Warner 
(1985), Hakes (1988 and 1990), Romer and Romer (1989). This approach has the drawback 
that there is substantial room for differences between the policymaker’s announcements and 
his/her true preferences. 
The approach we intend to follow here is to consider the policymaker’s actual choices in 
determining the level of financial supervision unification (factual approach). In each random 
point of time, we observe the policymaker’s decision to maintain or reform the financial 
supervision architecture, choosing the level of unification. In other words we consider 
policymakers faced with discrete choices.  
Building an empirical analysis consistent with this discrete choice process in a cross-
country perspective involves claiming the existence of unobservable policymaker’s utilities 
Uij, where each Uij is the utility received by the ith national policymaker from the jth level of 
financial unification. Since the utility Uij is unobservable, we represent it as a random 
quantity, assuming that it is composed of a systematic part U and an random error term ε. 
Furthermore, we claim that the utilities Uij are a function of the attributes of the 
alternative institutional level of financial unification and of the structural characteristics of the 
policymaker’s country.  
Combining the two hypotheses, we have a random utility framework for the unobservable 
financial unification variable. As usual, we assume that the errors εij are independent for each 
national policymaker and institutional alternative, as well as normally distributed. The 
independence assumption implies that the utility derived by one national policymaker is not 
related to the utility derived by any other national policymaker, and that the utility that a 
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policymaker derives from the choice of a given level of financial consolidation is not related 
to the utility provided by the other alternative. In the factual approach the first crucial issue is 
the measurement of the policymaker’s choices, that is the definition of the dependent variable.  
 
3. Financial Supervision Unification and Central Bank Involvement 
The first problem when considering financial supervision concentration as a dependent 
variable, is to construct this variable. How can the degree of concentration of financial 
supervision powers be measured? To this end we use the financial authorities concentration 
index (FAC Index, Table 1B) proposed in Masciandaro (2004)2. The index has the maximum 
score (7) in countries where all the supervision responsibilities are in the hands of a single 
agency, this can be a new financial services authority – as in the UK or Germany – or the 
central bank – as in Ireland. Symmetrically, the index takes the minimum score (1) in 
countries with highly fragmentised supervisory regimes – as in the US or France. 
But we should also consider the nature of the institutions involved in supervisory 
responsibilities, focusing on the distinction between the central bank and any other form of 
institution at least for two reasons. 
First of all, any supervisory regime will have to provide a link between supervision and 
the central bank, given the potential relationship between monetary stability and financial 
stability. It has been pointed out correctly (Llewellyn 2005) that, irrespective of its role, the 
central bank is the ultimate authority for the systemic stability of the payment system. Thus, 
among the authorities that can have supervisory responsibility, the central bank has a special 
nature being the institution responsible for monetary policy. Furthermore, the special 
                                                 
2  The construction of the index is described in Appendix 8.1. 
